

In search of macroprudential policy effectiveness

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Outline

Introduction and motivation

Systematic searching of literature

Treatment of interaction variables

How does macroprudential policy effect bank resilience?

Conclusions

What do we know about the effectiveness of macroprudential policy?

- Araujo et al. (2020):
 - Significant effects on credit: Larger effects found in studies using micro-level data compared to those using macro-level data.
 - Heterogeneity across countries: effects tend to be stronger in emerging markets, although these come with larger confidence intervals.
 - Impact on economic activity: Tightening of macroprudential policy has a negative impact on economic activity in the near term.
 - Effects of Different Tools: Different macroprudential tools have varying impacts, e.g. tightening loan-to-value (LTV) or debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratios has significant effects on reducing household credit, but effects on house prices are weaker and more imprecise.

What do we know about the effectiveness of macroprudential policy?

- Malovaná et al. (2022):
 - Borrower-based measures have significant impact on credit: loan-to-value (LTV), debt-to-income (DTI), and debt service-to-income (DSTI) limits, can lower credit growth, with stronger effects when multiple measures are applied simultaneously.
 - Strong evidence of publication bias found: researchers show a preference for reporting negative and significant estimates while under-reporting positive or nonsignificant results. This bias inflates the perceived effectiveness of borrower-based measures in reducing credit growth.
 - Heterogeneity in Estimates: differences in estimated effects are primarily explained by model specification, estimation method, and underlying data characteristics.

What do we know about the effectiveness of macroprudential policy?

- Malovaná et al. (2023):
 - Variable Impact of bank capital on lending: Increasing the simple capital-to-asset ratio positively influences annual credit growth, while raising capital requirements negatively impacts lending, with a significant publication bias found in the latter.
 - Heterogeneity and influencing factors: substantial variability in estimates found, explained by differences in data, model specifications, and macroeconomic conditions, with more positive effects on corporate credit compared to household or total credit.
 - Policy and low Interest Rates: The relationship between bank capital and lending weakens during periods of low interest rates, underscoring the need for carefully crafted capital regulations to ensure a balance between financial stability and credit availability.

And, what don't we know about the effectiveness of macroprudential policy?

- It is unclear whether commonly-accepted literature searching practices could be a source of bias in meta-regression analysis
- Meta-regression analysts often discard estimates of effects conditioned on interaction variables
- All three of these meta-regression studies collected data on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy through 2020, and the literature has exploded since then (more on this later)
- More is known about the financial-cycle moderating impacts of macroprudential policy than the resilience-enhancing aspects

Typical search syntax used for meta-studies

Araujo et al. (2020):

"Effectiveness of macroprudential policies" [also replacing "effectiveness" with "effect" and "impact"

Malovaná et al. (2022):

"LTV" OR "LTI" OR "DSTI" OR "DTI" OR "borrower-based" OR "loan-to-value" OR "loan-to-income" OR "debt-service-to-income" OR "debt-to-income" AND "lending" OR "credit" "loans"

Malovaná et al. (2023):

"bank capital regulation" OR "capital requirements" OR "bank capital" OR "capitalsurplus" OR "capital ratio" OR "macroprudential regulation" OR "macroprudential policy" AND "lending" OR "credit" OR "loans"

Subsequent screening considered 300-500 studies, but how many hits did Google Scholar produce?

Google Scholar search syntax used in previous metaregression studies and their equivalents in Web of Science and SCOPUS

| | Google Scholar | Web of Science | SCOPUS |
|-----------------------|---|--|--|
| APPVY1 | "Effectiveness of macroprudential | TS=("Effectiveness of | TITLE-ABS-KEY("Effectiveness of |
| | policies" (4, 41) | macroprudential policies") | macroprudential policies") |
| APPVY1B | "Effectiveness" AND "macroprudential policies" (4, 46) | TS=("Effectiveness" AND "macroprudential policies") | TITLE-ABS-KEY("Effectiveness" AND "macroprudential policies") |
| APPVY2 | "Effect of macroprudential policies" (4, 35) | "Effect of macroprudential policies" | TITLE-ABS-KEY("Effect of macroprudential policies") |
| APPVY2B | "Effect" AND "macroprudential policies" (4, 39) | TS=("Effect" AND "macroprudential policies") | TITLE-ABS-KEY("Effect" AND "macroprudential policies") |
| APPVY3 | "Impact of macroprudential policies" (4, 35) | TS=("Impact of macroprudential policies") | TITLE-ABS-KEY("Impact of macroprudential policies") |
| APPVY3B | "Impact" AND macroprudential policies" (4, 39) | TS=("Impact" AND macroprudential policies") | TITLE-ABS-KEY("Impact" AND "macroprudential policies") |
| APPVY4B | "Macroprudential policies" AND ("Effectiveness" OR "Effect" OR "Impact") (8,71) | TS=("Macroprudential policies") AND TS=("Effectiveness" OR "Effect" OR "Impact") | TITLE-ABS-KEY("Macroprudential policies") AND (TITLE-ABS-KEY("Effectiveness") OR TITLE-ABS-KEY("Effect") OR TITLE-ABS-KEY("Impact")) |
| MHBG21 | "bank capital regulation" OR "capital requirements" OR "bank capital" OR "capital surplus" OR "capital ratio" OR "macroprudential regulation" OR "macroprudential policy" AND "lending" OR "credit" | TS=("bank capital regulation" OR "capital requirements" OR "bank capital" OR "capital surplus" OR "capital ratio" OR "macroprudential regulation" OR "macroprudential policy") AND TS=("lending" OR "credit" OR "loans") | TITLE-ABS-KEY("bank capital regulation" OR "capital requirements" OR "bank capital" OR "capital surplus" OR "capital surplus" OR "capital surplus" OR "capital surplus" OR "capital regulation" OR "macroprudential regulation" OR "macroprudential policy") AND (TITLE-ABS-KEY("lending" OR "credit" OR "loans")) |
| MHGB22 | OR "loans" "LTV" OR "LTI" OR "DSTI" OR "DTI" OR "borrower-based" OR "loan-to- value" OR "loan-to-income" OR "debt-service-to-income" OR "debt- to-income" AND "lending" OR "credit" "loans" | TS=("LTV" OR "LTI" OR "DSTI" OR "DTI" OR "DTI" OR "borrower-based" OR "loan-to-value" OR "loan-to-income" OR "debt-service-to-income" OR "debt-to-income") AND TS=("lending" OR "credit" OR "loans") | TITLE-ABS-KEY("LTV" OR "LTI" OR "DSTI" OR "DTI" OR "borrower-based" OR "loan-to-value" OR "loan-to-income" OR "debt-service-to-income" OR "debt-to-income") AND (TITLE-ABS-KEY("lending" OR "credit" OR "loans")) |
| HHBG21 + MHGB22 | ("macroprudential policy" OR "loan-to-value" OR "LTV" OR "capital requirements" OR "bank capital" OR "macroprudential regulation" OR "debt-to-income" OR "bank capital regulation" OR "capital ratio" OR "LTI" OR "DSI" OR "DTI" OR "borrower-based" OR "capital surplus" OR "loan-to-income") AND ("credit" OR "lending" OR "loans") | TS=("macroprudential policy" OR "loan-to-value" OR "LTV" OR "capital requirements" OR "bank capital" OR "macroprudential regulation" OR "debt-to-income" OR "debt-service-to-income" OR "debt-service-to-income" OR "bank capital regulation" OR "capital ratio" OR "I'll" OR "DSTI" OR "DTI" OR "D | TITLE-ABS-KEY("macroprudential policy" OR "loan-to-value" OR "LTV" OR "capital requirements" OR "bank capital" OR "debt-to-income" OR "debt-to-income" OR "debt-to-income" OR "bank capital regulation" OR "capital regulation" OR "capital ratio" OR "LIT" OR "bSTI" OR "DTI" OR "borrower-based" OR "Capital surplus" OR "loan-to-income" JAND (ITILE-ABS-KEY("credit" OR "lending" OR "loans")) |

Number of studies identified by earlier metaresearchers with search syntax used in previous meta-regression studies: 65 studies in total

| | # of 65 studies | (words, characters | Google So | Scholar Web of Science | | SCOPUS | | |
|---------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|--------|-------------|------|
| | | | to 2020* | All | to 2020* | All | to 2020* | All |
| APPVY1 | - | (4, 41) | 964 | 1780 | 11 | 23 | 23 | 45 |
| APPVY1B | 10 | (4, 46) | 4370 | 7440 | 44 | 86 | 93 | 170 |
| APPVY2 | - | (4, 35) | 132 | 312 | 82 | 8 | 22 | 57 |
| APPVY2B | 19 | (4, 39) | 6380 | 11000 | 35 | 86 | 195 | 416 |
| APPVY3 | - | (4, 35) | 311 | 674 | 8 | 21 | 15 | 45 |
| APPVY3B | 11 | (4, 39) | 6800 | 11700 | 59 | 123 | 146 | 308 |
| APPVY4B | 21 | (8, 71) | 7510 | 12800 | 102 | 221 | 313 | 633 |
| MHBG21 | 46 | (27, 210) | 18200 | 19000 | 1074 | 1836 | 1328 | 2399 |
| MHGB22 | 33 | (23, 281) | 18000 | 128000 | 292 | 490 | 436 | 813 |
| MHBG21 | | | | | | | | |
| + | 55 | (45, 353) | 775000 | 207000 | 1824 | 2194 | 1655 | 3033 |
| MHGB22 | | | | 0 | | | | |

^{*}The time search window for MHBG21 and MHGB22 is 2010 to 2020, inclusive.

Analysis of language used in studies of macroprudential policy effectiveness: Titles

| | Key parameters | Double-check | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|-------------|--------------|-----------|------------------|---------|-------|
| | # of unique words/terr | 230 230 | | | | | | |
| | Total # of words/terms | 509 509 | Rank | | Total-to- | % of words | | |
| | | | Average | Weighted | unique | Total | Unique | Ratio |
| | New categories | | | | ratio | | | |
| | 1 Macroprudential policy | | | | | 15.72% | 19.13% | 0.82 |
| 1./ | A General | | 94 | 37 | 3.55 | 7.66% | 4.78% | 1.60 |
| 1.1 | B Specific | | 119 | 102 | 1.24 | 8.06% | 14.35% | 0.56 |
| | 2 Policy objective | | | | | 7.86% | 13.91% | 0.56 |
| 2./ | A General | | 175 | 175 | 1.00 | 1.96% | 4.35% | 0.45 |
| 2.1 | B Specific | | 123 | 98 | 1.36 | 5.89% | 9.57% | 0.62 |
| | 3 Effectiveness | | | | | 9.04% | 9.57% | 0.94 |
| 3./ | A General | | 134 | 134 | 1.00 | 0.98% | 2.17% | 0.45 |
| 3.1 | B Specific | | 99 | 53 | 2.41 | 8.06% | 7.39% | 1.09 |
| | 4 Empirical study | | | | | 14.73% | 21.74% | 0.68 |
| 4./ | A General | | 111 | 53 | 2.46 | 6.29% | 5.65% | 1.11 |
| 4.1 | B Unit of analysis | | 94 | 79 | 1.27 | 2.75% | 4.78% | 0.58 |
| 4.0 | C Data type | | 102 | 102 | 1.00 | 0.59% | 1.30% | 0.45 |
| 4.[| Specific methodology | | 152 | 152 | 1.00 | 0.59% | 1.30% | 0.45 |
| 4. | E Region/Country | | 127 | 118 | 1.15 | 4.52% | 8.70% | 0.52 |
| ! | 5 Other relevant | | 163 | 152 | 1.10 | 2.16% | 4.35% | 0.50 |
| (| 6 Monetary policy | | 42 | 39 | 2.50 | 0.98% | 0.87% | 1.13 |
| | 7 Stopwords | | 74 | 16 | 7.07 | 40.28% | 12.61% | 3.19 |
| | 8 Dates, numbers, etc. | | 61 | 56 | 1.17 | 1.38% | 2.61% | 0.53 |
| 9 | 9 Words having low discriminato | ry power | 138 | 125 | 1.14 | 7.86% | 15.22% | 0.52 |
| Лето | Useful words/terms | | | | | 50.49% | 69.57% | |
| | Number of words/terms | | | | | 509 | 230 | |
| | Category where words are used | frequently | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| Titles reveal information on | Titles reveal information on | Macroprudential policy | Keywords re | veal informa | ition on | Macropruden | | |
| | | Effectivenesss | | | | Policy objective | /e | |
| | | Empirical study | | | | Monetary pol | icy | |
| | | Monetary policy | | | | | | |
| | Value-added | | | | | | | |

Analysis of language used in studies of macroprudential policy effectiveness: Key words

| | Key parameters | Double-check | | | | | | | |
|------|---|-----------------------|-------------|----------|-----------------------|-----------|-----------------------|---------|-------|
| | # of unique words 1 | .46 146 | | | | | | | |
| | Total # of words 2 | 274 274 | | | | | | | |
| | | | | Rank | | Total-to- | % of words | ; | |
| | | | | Average | Weighted | unique | Total | Unique | Ratio |
| | New categories | | | | | ratio | | | |
| 1 | Macroprudential policy | | | | | | 37.23% | 29.45% | 1.26 |
| 1.A | General | | | 75 | 17 | 5.10 | 18.61% | 6.85% | 2.72 |
| 1.B | Specific | | | 69 | 50 | 1.55 | 18.61% | 22.60% | 0.82 |
| 2 | Policy objective | | | | | | 32.12% | 30.14% | 1.07 |
| 2.A | General | | | 50 | 30 | 2.18 | 8.76% | 7.53% | 1.16 |
| 2.B | Specific | | | 69 | 42 | 1.94 | 23.36% | 22.60% | 1.03 |
| 3 | Effectiveness | | | | | | 3.65% | 4.11% | 0.89 |
| 3.A | General | | | 67 | 67 | 1.00 | 0.36% | 0.68% | 0.53 |
| 3.B | Specific | | | 84 | 56 | 1.80 | 3.28% | 3.42% | 0.96 |
| 4 | Empirical study | | | | | | 15.33% | 22.60% | 0.68 |
| 4.A | General | | | 118 | 118 | 1.00 | 1.09% | 2.05% | 0.53 |
| 4.B | Unit of analysis | | | 71 | 61 | 1.25 | 1.82% | 2.74% | 0.67 |
| 4.0 | / [| | | 46 | 39 | 1.50 | 2.19% | 2.74% | 0.80 |
| 4.D | Specific methodology | | | 86 | 74 | 1.33 | 7.30% | 10.27% | 0.71 |
| 4.E | Region/Country | | | 84 | 77 | 1.14 | 2.92% | 4.79% | 0.61 |
| 5 | Other relevant | | | 83 | 67 | 1.33 | 4.38% | 6.16% | 0.71 |
| 6 | Monetary policy | | | 94 | 32 | 3.33 | 3.65% | 2.05% | 1.78 |
| 7 | Stopwords | | | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0.00% | 0.00% | N/A |
| 8 | Dates, numbers, etc. | | | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0.00% | 0.00% | N/A |
| 9 | Words having low discriminato | ry power | | 82 | 71 | 1.25 | 3.65% | 5.48% | 0.67 |
| Memo | Useful words | | | | | | 96.35% | 94.52% | |
| | Number of words/terms | | | | | | 274 | 146 | |
| | Category where words are used | d frequently | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | Adding-up | check | 100.00% | 100.00% | |
| | Titles reveal information on Macroprude | | tial policy | Keywords | reveal information on | | Macroprudential polic | | y |
| | | Effectivenesss | | | | | Policy object | ctive | |
| | | Empirical stud | | | | | Monetary p | oolicy | |
| | | Monetary poli | icy | | | | | | |
| | Value-added | | | | | | | | |

A complement minimizing search algorithm: Results for Macroprudential policy terms

| JMMAR\ | OUTPUT TABLE | Algorithm | + plurals + | missing top | -10 | | |
|--------|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|--------|
| | | | Source | # Hits | | selection | |
| Term # | | | of term | Total | Incrementa | criteria | |
| 1 | macroprudential polic | y | T, K | 36 | 36 | A, TT | |
| 2 | macroprudential polic | macroprudential policies | | 21 | 8 | A, TT | |
| 3 | capital requirement | | K | 14 | 7 | A, TT | |
| 4 | loan-to-value ratio | | T, K | 16 | 5 | A, TT | |
| 5 | changing regulation | | 0 | 2 | 2 | Α | |
| 6 | liquidity regulation | | Т | 2 | 2 | Α | |
| 7 | bank capital | | K | 12 | 1 | A, TT | |
| 8 | Itv ratios | | K | 5 | 1 | Α | |
| 9 | macroprudential instru | uments | T, K | 6 | 1 | A, TT | |
| 10 | macroprudential meas | ures | Т | 10 | 1 | A, TT | |
| 11 | macro-prudential tool | | Т | 3 | 1 | Α | |
| 12 | bank capital requirem | ent | K | 7 | 0 | TT | |
| 13 | capital buffer | | T, K | 6 | 0 | TT | |
| 14 | capital requirements | | T, K | 12 | 0 | TT, P | |
| 15 | loan-to-value ratios | | T, K | 9 | 0 | TT, P | |
| 16 | macroprudential regul | ation | K | 8 | 0 | TT | |
| 17 | macroprudential tool | | Т | 8 | 0 | TT | |
| 18 | macroprudential tools | | Т | 6 | 0 | TT, P | |
| | | | | | | | Count |
| | # of studies identified | | | | 65 | | |
| | Correlation - Algorithm | n selection- | Total Hits (| only for teri | ms selected b | y algorithr | n 0.78 |
| | R-squared | | | - | | - | 0.61 |

Notes: In the column entitled source of term, T,K, and O denote title, key words, and other respectively. In the column entitled "selection criteria", A, TT, and P denote algorithm, top ten, and plural respectively.

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A complement minimizing search algorithm: Results for policy

| MMAR | Y OUTPUT TABLE A | lgorithm + plurals | + missing top | -10 | | |
|--------|--------------------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|-------------|-------|
| | | Source | # Hits | | selection | |
| Гerm # | | of term | Total | Incrementa | criteria | |
| 1 | credit growth | 0 | 23 | 23 | Α | |
| 2 | housing market | K | 11 | 8 | A, TT | |
| 3 | financial stability | K | 13 | 4 | A, TT | |
| 4 | systemic risk | K | 8 | 4 | A, TT | |
| 5 | financial cycle | K | 5 | 4 | Α | |
| 6 | credit supply | Т, К | 7 | 4 | A, TT | |
| 7 | loan growth | K | 3 | 3 | Α | |
| 8 | house prices | Т, К | 13 | 2 | A, TT, P | |
| 9 | financial intermediation | K | 2 | 2 | Α | |
| 10 | auto loans | Т, К | 2 | 2 | Α | |
| 11 | mortgage risk | Т | 2 | 2 | Α | |
| 12 | household credit | Т, К | 4 | 1 | Α | |
| 13 | housing finance | Т | 4 | 1 | Α | |
| 14 | capital ratios | Т | 2 | 1 | Α | |
| 15 | residential investment | K | 2 | 1 | Α | |
| 16 | bank risk | Т, К | 1 | 1 | Α | |
| 17 | mortgage pricing | Т, К | 1 | 1 | Α | |
| 18 | probability of crisis | 0 | 1 | 1 | Α | |
| 19 | bank credit | K | 8 | 0 | TT | |
| 20 | bank lending | Т, К | 8 | 0 | TT | |
| 21 | house price growth | K | 6 | 0 | TT | |
| 22 | housing credit | K | 6 | 0 | TT | |
| | # of studios identified | | | 65 | | Count |
| | # of studies identified | laarithm salastiss | Total Hits / am | | salastad bu | 0.00 |
| | Marginal correlation - A | igorithm selection | - rotal Hits (or | ily for terms | selected by | |
| | R-squared | | | | | 0.43 |

Notes: In the column entitled source of term, T,K, and O denote title, key words, and other respectively. In the column entitled "selection criteria", A, TT, and P denote algorithm, top ten, and plural respectively.

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A complement minimizing search algorithm: Results for policy effectiveness terms

| UMMAR | Y OUTPUT TA | BLE | Algorithm | + plurals + | missing top | -10 | | |
|--------|--------------|-------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|-------|
| | | | | Source | # Hits | | selection | |
| Term # | | | | of term | Total | Increment | a criteria | |
| 1 | effect | | | Т | 53 | 53 | A, TT | |
| 2 | impact | | | Т | 26 | 6 | A, TT | |
| 3 | affect | | | Т | 16 | 2 | A, TT | |
| 4 | consequenc | es | | 0 | 3 | 2 | Α | |
| 5 | influence | | | Т | 4 | 1 | A, TT | |
| 6 | amplify | | | 0 | 2 | 1 | Α | |
| 7 | effective | | | Т | 30 | 0 | TT | |
| 8 | effects | | | Т | 28 | 0 | TT, P | |
| 9 | effectivenes | SS | | T, K | 24 | 0 | TT | |
| 10 | work | | | Т | 8 | 0 | TT | |
| 11 | transmissio | n | | Т | 5 | 0 | TT | |
| 12 | respond | | | Т | 4 | 0 | TT | |
| 13 | leak | | | Т | 3 | 0 | TT | |
| | | | | | | | | Count |
| | # of studies | identified | | | | 65 | | |
| | Marginal co | rrelation - | Algorithm | selection-T | otal Hits (on | ly for terms | selected by | 0.22 |
| | R-squared | | | | | | | 0.05 |

Notes: In the column entitled source of term, T,K, and O denote title, key words, and other respectively. In the column entitled "selection criteria", A, TT, and P denote algorithm, top ten, and plural respectively.

A complement minimizing search algorithm: Results for empirical study terms

| JIVIIVIAK | Y OUTPUT TABLE | Aigorithm | + piurais + | missing top | -10 | | |
|-----------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|-------|
| | | | Source | # Hits | | selection | |
| Term # | | | of term | Total | Increment | a criteria | |
| 1 | data | | T, K | 39 | 39 | A, TT | |
| 2 | find | | 0 | 31 | 12 | A, TT | |
| 3 | evidence | | Т | 33 | 6 | A, TT | |
| 4 | banks | | T, K | 27 | 2 | A, TT, P | |
| 5 | countries | | Т | 22 | 1 | A, TT | |
| 6 | empirical | | Т | 14 | 1 | A, TT | |
| 7 | estimated | | 0 | 33 | 1 | Α | |
| 8 | vector autoregression | | 0 | 31 | 1 | Α | |
| 9 | estimating | | Т | 22 | 1 | Α | |
| 10 | co-integration | | K | 15 | 1 | Α | |
| 11 | panel | | T, K | 14 | 0 | TT | |
| 12 | economies | | T, K | 8 | 0 | TT | |
| 13 | country | | Т | 6 | 0 | TT | |
| 14 | regressions | | K | 4 | 0 | TT | |
| | | | | | | | Count |
| | # of studies identified | | | | 65 | | |
| | Marginal correlation - | Algorithm s | election-T | otal Hits (on | ly for terms | selected by | 0.55 |
| | R-squared | | | | | | 0.30 |

Notes: In the column entitled source of term, T,K, and O denote title, key words, and other respectively. In the column entitled "selection criteria", A, TT, and P denote algorithm, top ten, and plural respectively.

Number of studies identified by complement minimizing search algorithm

| | # of 65 studies | (words, characters) | Google Scho | olar | Web of Scie | nce | SCOPUS | |
|--|--------------------|---------------------|-------------|--------|-------------|----------|--------|--------|
| | | | 2010 - 2020 | 2010 - | 2010 - 2020 | 2010 - | 2010 - | 2010 - |
| Policy (A) | 65 | (32, 279) | 17300 | 16600 | 1814 | 2781 | 3541 | 3645 |
| Policy (A,TT,P) | 65 | (54, 466) | 19500 | 19200 | 3068 | 4490 | 3810 | 5650 |
| Objective (A) | 65 | (54, 374) | 17700 | 17900 | 15475 | 23604 | 10569 | 16405 |
| Objective (A,TT,P) | 65 | (67, 453) | 17700 | 17900 | 17118 | 26124 | 12005 | 18642 |
| Effectivenes s (A) | 65 | (11, 78) | 755000 | 788000 | 6501049 | 9530243 | 240801 | 384860 |
| Effectivenes s (A,TT,P) | 65 | (25, 176) | 738000 | 791000 | 11533081 | 16759794 | 299975 | 472820 |
| Empirical (A) | 65 | (20, 149) | 761000 | 786000 | 7425642 | 10739386 | 313839 | 485500 |
| Empirical (A,TT,P) | 65 | (28, 205) | 741000 | 797000 | 7668181 | 11082036 | 349878 | 537775 |
| Policy + Effectivenes s (A) | 65 | (44, 366) | 17300 | 17100 | 825 | 1360 | 1297 | 2092 |
| Policy + Effectivenes s (A,TT,P) | 65 | (80, 651) | 19500 | 19800 | 1868 | 2860 | 1578 | 2523 |
| Policy + Effectivenes s + Objective (A) | 65 | (99,747) | 17700 | 17400 | 357 | 622 | 572 | 936 |
| Policy + Effectivenes s + Objective (A,TT,P) | 65 | (148,1111) | 19200 | 19500 | 842 | 1357 | 780 | 1266 |
| Policy + Effectivenes s + Objective + Empirical (A) | 65 | (120,903) | 17700 | 17400 | 315 | 566 | 529 | 873 |
| Policy + Effectivenes s + Objective + Empirical (A,TT,P) | 65 | (177,1323) | 18900 | 19900 | 679 | 1123 | 661 | 109: |

Treatment of interaction variables

Consider the simple interaction model:

$$Y = b_0 + b_1 X + b_2 (X \cdot I) + \epsilon$$

The effect of X on Y is then $b_1 + b_2 \cdot I$

If we allow dependence, then:

$$Var(b_1 + b_2 \cdot I) = Var(b_1) + 2 \cdot I \cdot Cov(b_1, b_2) + I^2 \cdot Var(b_2) + b_2^2 \cdot Var(I) + 2(Cov(b_1, I) + I \cdot Cov(b_2, I))b_2$$


Under independence, the expression is:

$$Var(b_1 + b_2 \cdot I) = Var(b_1) + I \cdot 2 \cdot Var(b_2) + b_2^2 \cdot Var(I) + Var(b_2) \cdot Var(I)$$

Meta-regression analysis of the effect of macroprudential policy on bank resilience

- Five studies with a homogenous measure of bank risk:
 Z-score measured annually
- All of them include interaction terms

Macroprudential policies raise bank risk




Borrower-based measures lower bank risk, while lender-based and other measures raise it


$$\beta = \frac{b}{\sigma_y}$$

 $\beta = \frac{\sigma_x}{\sigma_y} \cdot b$

Partially standardised coefficients

Fully standardised coefficients






Macroprudential policies raise bank risk


$$\beta = \frac{b}{\sigma_y} \cdot$$

Funnel plot of partially standardized coefficients



$$\beta = \frac{\sigma_x}{\sigma_y} \cdot b$$

Funnel plot of fully standardised coefficients



Funnel Asymmetry test: $t_i = \beta_1 + \beta_0 \cdot (1/SE) + v_i$ Negative effects of macroprudential policy on bank risk are genuine

Partial Standardisation Full standardisation

| D | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|-------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Regressic | on | | | | | | | |
| Statistics | | | | | | | | |
| Multiple R | 0.666 | | | | | | | |
| R Square | 0.443 | | | | | | | |
| Adjusted R | | | | | | | | |
| Square | 0.434 | | | | | | | |
| Standard | | | | | | | | |
| Error | 3.072 | | | | | | | |
| Observations | 67 | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |

ANOVA

| df | SS | MS | F | Significance F |
|----|----------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1 | 487.969 | 487.969 | 51.696 | 0.000 |
| 65 | 613.546 | 9.439 | | |
| 66 | 1101.515 | | | |
| | 1 65 | 1 487.969 65 613.546 | 1 487.969 487.969 65 613.546 9.439 | 1 487.969 487.969 51.696 65 613.546 9.439 |

| | Coeffi | Standard | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------|----------|--------|---------|-----------|-----------|
| | cients | Error | t Stat | P-value | Lower 95% | Upper 95% |
| Intercept Bias adjusted | -0.135 | 0.394 | -0.343 | 0.733 | -0.923 | 0.653 |
| effect | -0.015 | 0.002 | -7.190 | 0.000 | -0.020 | -0.011 |

| Regression Statistics | | | | | |
|-----------------------|--------|--|--|--|--|
| | 0.6143 | | | | |
| Multiple R | 93 | | | | |
| | 0.3774 | | | | |
| R Square | 79 | | | | |
| Adjusted R | 0.3661 | | | | |
| Square | 61 | | | | |
| | 4.5671 | | | | |
| Standard Error | 77 | | | | |
| Observations | 57 | | | | |
| | | | | | |

ANOVA

| , · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----|----------|---------|--------|----------------|--|--|--|
| | df | SS | MS | F | Significance F | | | |
| Regression | 1 | 695.661 | 695.661 | 33.350 | 0.000 | | | |
| Residual | 55 | 1147.251 | 20.859 | | | | | |
| Total | 56 | 1842.912 | | | | | | |

| | Coeffic | | | | |
|---------------|------------|-------------|--------|---------|-----------|
| | ients Star | ndard Error | t Stat | P-value | Lower 95% |
| Intercept | -0.235 | 0.654 | -0.359 | 0.721 | -1.545 |
| Bias adjusted | | | | | |
| effect | -0.026 | 0.005 | -5.775 | 0.000 | -0.035 |

Conclusions

"A critical feature of this search is that it should be as comprehensive as possible", Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012)

- The search step in meta-regression analysis could be prone to bias if it relies on Google Scholar
- Many meta-regression practitioners add a further step of so-called "snowballing" but there is a more efficient way to be as comprehensive as possible
- A complement-minimizing algorithm also ensures that metaregression analyses are replicable